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CHAPTER XIII
ENFORCEMENT
The military authorities of a visiting armed force must neces-
sarily have the power to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the
receiving state. This generalization by no means implies, however,
that they must have all the many powers which a state may
exercise in its own territory. A state, in the ordinary enforce-
ment of its criminal law, may, anywhere in its territory, through
its police, conduct investigations, make arrests, and hold in-
dividuals in custody. A state may try an accused and, in that
connection, summon witnesses and punish those who fail to ap-
pear, refuse to testify, or give false testimony. Those who par-
ticipate in the trial can be protected against claims for or
charges of defamation. If the accused is convicted, a sentence
may be imposed and carried out. A state may, in general, ex-
ercise these powers with respect to any person found in its terri-
tory, subject only to the limitations imposed by its constitution
and by denial of justice doctrines.
International law, in the absence of treaty, hardly accords the
panoply of such powers to the military authorities of the sending
state. Nor does it necessarily deny all of them to the receiving
state, even if the visiting forces are in general immune from its
jurisdiction. 1 This is, moreover, a peculiarly sensitive area. Mili-
tary police of a foreign state, operating in a receiving state,
represent a visible, tangible encroachment on the receiving state's
"sovereignty," even if they exercise power only over members of
the visiting force. If they exercise power over a national of the
receiving state, resentment is inevitable. Conversely, the in-
cidents that attend the arrest, interrogation and confinement of
a member of the visiting force by the local authorities may
peculiarly arouse the resentment of the sending state and its
citizens.
The police of a visiting force may not exercise their powers
1 Supra, p. 92 ; 130 et seq.
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within the receiving state without its consent, express or implied.
Consent to the presence of a visiting force does not necessarily
imply permission for its police to exercise their powers, e.g., per-
mitting the crew of a warship to come ashore does not neces-
sarily imply permission for the landing of a shore patrol. 2 Such
consent may imply permission for the police of the force to oper-
ate within a base (as they may on a warship in a foreign port)
or where the forces are engaged in actual military operations. It
does not necessarily imply permission for the police to operate
elsewhere in the receiving state, or to exercise power over anyone
not a member of the force, except possibly on a base or where
the forces are engaged in actual military operations.
Courts-martial of a sending state may certainly sit in the re-
ceiving state and try an accused member of the force. They can
summon members of the force as witnesses, and punish them for
contempt or perjury. They quite clearly cannot exercise such
power with respect to those not members of the force. Pre-
sumably, the sending state can carry out a sentence of imprison-
ment or, perhaps, execution on a base or where the force is
engaged in actual military operations; perhaps it cannot do so
elsewhere in the receiving state.
Presumably the police of the receiving state can arrest and
hold in custody a member of the visiting force for any offense for
which they can try and punish him. Probably they can also take
any reasonable steps to restrain him when he is in the act of
committing a crime. It may be, however, that they can do none
of these on a base—the analogies of the inviolability of an em-
bassy and of a warship are relevant here—or where the force
is present as a force, in actual military operations.
These general conclusions are necessarily tentative. Authority
is too sparse and inconclusive to give clear answers. Also here
as elsewhere varying circumstances may suggest different conclu-
sions on some or all of the problems.
The post-World War II agreements to which the United States
is a party have dealt more or less comprehensively with these
problems. The agreed solutions have varied here as they have in
other areas.
2 Article 0625, U.S. Navy Regs., supra, p. 75, n. 35.
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POLICE POWER
The NATO Agreement is both less than precise and less than
comprehensive with respect to enforcement jurisdiction.
The sending state has the right "to police any camps, establish-
ments, or other premises which they occupy" by agreement, and
its military police "may take all appropriate measures to ensure
the maintenance of order and security of such premises." 3 But
"outside these premises, such military police shall be employed
only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the receiving
State and in liaison with those authorities, and in so far as such
employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among
the members of the force." 4 There is no express provision on the
question of whether the police of the sending state may arrest
one not a member of the visiting force for an offense on a base.
Perhaps the general grant to "take all appropriate measures" on
a base is qualified by the blanket provision denying the sending
state any right to exercise jurisdiction over other than members
of the force. 5
The right of the police of the receiving state to arrest members
of the visiting force is recognized in the provision that "the au-
thorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each
other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component
or their dependents ***."« it is implicit in the provision that
"The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the
military authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any
member of a force or civilian component or dependent." 7 The
phrase "assist each other" is less than clear. Neither provision
sets any limitation on the power to arrest, as on a base. 8
8 Article VII, 10(a).
4 Article VII, 10(b).
5 Article VII, 4.
* Article VII, 5(a). Article 6(c) provides that "the authorities of the re-
ceiving and sending States shall assist each other in the carrying out of all
necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production
of evidence * * *."
7 Article VII, 5(b).
8 The Agreement with Iceland varies just enough from the NATO Agree-
ment, with regard to enforcement, to raise further troubling doubts. Thus,
in Article 2(10), the military police of the United States are given au-
thority outside the agreed areas "subject to arrangements with the authori-
ties of Iceland and jointly with those authorities." In the NATO Agreement
the language is not "jointly with" but "in liaison with."
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The Agreed Minutes which supplement the arrangement with
Japan clarify and implement the provisions relating to police
power. The American authorities have exclusive power to arrest
within facilities and areas in use and guarded by our forces,
subject only to the power of the Japanese police to arrest with
American consent or when in pursuit of a flagrant offender. The
United States undertakes also to arrest, within such facilities
and areas, those not subject to its jurisdiction whose arrest is
requested by the Japanese. In addition, the United States au-
thorities may arrest in the vicinity of such facilities and areas
those committing an offense against their security. The United
States authorities are required immediately to turn over to the
Japanese authorities those not subject to American jurisdiction. 9
There are no implementing provisions regarding the power to
police outside such facilities and areas.
The Agreement with West Germany goes much further in
clarifying and implementing the NATO provisions. The Article
dealing with jurisdiction within an "accommodation" is not pre-
cise; it seemingly recognizes the power to police of the sending
state, but the power is not exclusive. 10 The right of the police of
the visiting force to patrol "on public roads, on public transport,
in restaurants (Gaststatten) and in all other places to which the
public has access and to take such measures with respect to the
members of a force, of a civilian component or dependents as are
necessary to maintain order and discipline" is expressly af-
firmed. 11 The right of the authorities of the sending state to
arrest a person not subject to their jurisdiction, if he is caught
or pursued in flagrante delicto, or has committed or is attempting
to commit an offense within or directed against an installation of
the sending state, is recognized, subject to detailed safeguards.
8 Agreed Minutes re paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b), 1. The Japanese agree
also not normally to exercise the right of search, seizure or inspection within
the facilities and areas, nor with respect to property of the United States
armed forces, wherever situated. Whenever such search, seizure or inspec-
tion is desired by the Japanese authorities, the United States is committed
to undertake it upon request. Agreed Minutes re paragraph 10(a) and
10(b), 2.
10 Article 53.
11 Article 28. The military police are required, where public order and
safety are endangered or disturbed by an incident involving members of a
force, etc., to take measures to maintain or restore order or discipline, if
so requested by the German authorities.
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The person taken into custody must be delivered to the German
authorities without delay. 12
The other agreements to which the United States is a party
vary over a wide range. The American forces in Korea are im-
mune from arrest by the local authorities "in view of prevailing
conditions, such as the infiltration of North Koreans into the
territory of the Republic, United States forces cannot be sub-
mitted, or instructed to submit, to the custody of any but United
States forces." The United States authorities can, on the other
hand, arrest Korean nationals "detected in the commission of
offenses against the United States forces or its members," but
must of course deliver them to the Korean authorities "as
speedily as practicable." The Agreement with Denmark on Green-
land apparently is to the same effect, within those defense areas
for which the United States is responsible. 13 At the other ex-
treme, the Agreement with Saudi Arabia apparently contemplates
that Dhahran Airfield be patrolled by Saudi Arab guards, ac-
companied by Americans, and that the Saudi Arabs have power
to arrest there, as they expressly do in the remaining areas to
which Americans may go.14
The Agreement with Ethiopia gives the United States exclu-
sive authority to make arrests, including arrests of Ethiopian
nationals, within the Installations occupied by the United States.15
It may exercise police powers outside the Installations "by ar-
rangement" with the Ethiopian authorities. 16 The Ethiopian au-
thorities may arrest members of the United States forces "outside
12 Article 20. The Convention with West Germany was, of course, much
more favorable to the sending state regarding the exercise of the power to
police. Members of a force were immune from arrest by the German au-
thorities, although they could be taken into custody, and searched in certain
cases, e.g., when apprehended in flagrante delicto. Authorities of a force
could arrest members of a force, and also those subject to German jurisdic-
tion in certain cases, e.g., within an installation. See generally Article 7.
18 Article VIII.
14 Paragraphs 12 and 13.
16 That the United States authority to arrest is exclusive is implicit in
Article XVII, 6: "The United States authorities shall deliver to the
Ethiopian authorities for trial and punishment all Ethiopian nationals and
other persons normally resident in Ethiopia who have been charged by the
Ethiopian or the United States authorities with having committed offenses
within the limits of the Installations." Article XVII, 7, gives the United
States power "to police the Installations and take appropriate measures" etc.
18 Article XVII, 8.
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the Installations for the commission or attempted commission of
an offense." 17 The Agreement with Libya, although in general
modelled on the NATO Agreement, is, with respect to the power
to police, much like the Ethiopian Agreement.18
The Agreement with the Philippines is explicit that only the
United States may exercise the power to police on a base, 19 except
with the permission of the commanding officer. There is no provi-
sion expressly authorizing the United States to exercise the
power to police outside a base, nor for the Philippine authorities
to arrest a member of the American forces outside a base, but
both powers are implied.20
The revised Leased Bases Agreement gives the United States
the exclusive right to arrest members of the United States forces
and United States nationals subject to United States military law
in a leased area
;
21
it does not deny the right of the local govern-
17 Article XVII, 5.
18 Article XX (8), which gives the United States power to police the agreed
areas and maintain order therein, adds the clause: "[A]nd may arrest
therein any alleged offenders and, when they are triable by the Libyan
courts, will forthwith turn them over to the Libyan authorities for trial."
This strongly suggests the United States power to police the agreed areas
is exclusive, even though under Article XX (3) "The United States and
Libyan authorities will assist each other in the arrest and handing over
to the appropriate authority of members of the United States forces" etc.
10 Article XIV. This is implicit also in Article XIII, 7, in which the
United States agrees not to grant asylum in a base to any person fleeing
Philippine jurisdiction. The commanding officer must, under Article XIV,
on request arrest an offender against Philippine law, where the Philippines
have jurisdiction, and surrender him to the Philippine authorities.
20 Article XIII, 1, 3, and 4.
21 Article VI of the Leased Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941 was not
changed when the provisions on jurisdiction were amended. Paragraph (2)
of Article VI is an agreement of the Government of the Territory to give
reciprocal facilities for the arrest and surrender of offenders. This hardly
implies that the United States may not arrest members of the American
forces outside a base, though presumably that requires a separate arrange-
ment with the local authorities.
Article IX (12) of the Agreement with The Federation of the West Indies
gives the United States express power to "police the defence areas" and to
"take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and
security within such defence areas." It is not stated that these powers are
exclusive, nor is it expressly stated that the powers granted include the
power to arrest others than members of the United States Forces, although
the language used is broad enough to extend to that power. This interpreta-
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ment to arrest others in a Leased area, nor contain any other
provisions on the power to police. The Dominican Agreement, on
the other hand, implicitly recognized the right of the United
States to arrest anyone on a "Site" but otherwise referred only to
assistance by the Dominican authorities in arresting offenders
subject to American jurisdiction.
From this review it is apparent that all the agreements, in-
cluding the NATO Agreement, deal only partially with the prob-
lem of the power to police of the sending and receiving states.
They leave much to implication or to customary law, and much to
implementation by supplemental agreements and municipal legis-
lation. Even their explicit provisions show no common pattern.
The only generalizations that seem permissible are that a dis-
tinction is made between the power to police on and off a base,
and between the power to arrest members of a force and na-
tionals or residents of the receiving state.
CUSTODY
Custody of the accused pending disposition of the charges
against him is, from one point of view, a detail. No jail is, how-
ever, a pleasant place to be, and in a situation where emotions
are so easily aroused, that a national and particularly a member
of the armed forces of one state is held in the jail of another state
can trouble international relations. Custody is at the same time
not a necessary concomitant of jurisdiction to try and punish.
There is, in brief, room for accommodation here without sacrifice
of any major principle.
It would seem that, in the absence of agreement, a state which
took an individual into custody could retain custody if it had
jurisdiction, concurrent or exclusive, to try and punish him.
Normally, of course, a state does not take an individual into
custody unless it has such jurisdiction, but it may as a preventive
tion is reinforced by the broad grant of powers to the United States in
Article II.
Clauses (5) (a) and (5) (b) of Article IX make it clear that either the
authorities of the Territory or the military authorities of the United States
may arrest members of the United States Forces, at least outside the
"defence areas."
Procedural Agreement No. 16 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements with
Spain expressly recognizes the right of both the Spanish authorities and the
United States military authorities to arrest members of the United States
Forces, without express limitation as to place. See Articles 3, 3j and 7.
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measure or by arrangement with another state. The problem is
further complicated when the concept of primary and secondary
jurisdiction is introduced.
The same clause of the NATO Agreement which directs the
authorities of both states to assist each other in making arrests,
directs such assistance "in handing them over to the authority
which is to exercise jurisdiction * * *.22 This is qualified, how-
ever, by the provision that "The custody of an accused member
of a force or civilian component over whom the receiving State
is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the send-
ing State, remain with that State until he is charged by the re-
ceiving State." 23 The sending state may, in brief, request custody
of the accused only if it has exclusive or primary jurisdiction to
try; it may retain custody where the receiving state has such
jurisdiction to try, but may not ask custody as a matter of
right. 24
Agreements supplemental to the NATO Agreement have been
made with the Netherlands and with Greece varying the NATO
arrangements regarding custody where the receiving state has
jurisdiction. The Netherlands Agreement gives the United States
custody "pending trial"
;
25 that with Greece "pending completion
of trial proceedings." 26 Under the more detailed provisions of
the 1963 Agreement with West Germany, 27 the sending state may
"Article VII, 5(a).
28 Article VII, 5(c). As to the possible meanings of the word "charged"
under the law of the several NATO members, see Snee and Pye, Status of
Forces Agreements: Criminal Jurisdiction, 92-93 (1957).
24 While neither of the provisions imposes an explicit obligation on the
sending state to take a member of its force into custody for a violation of
local law, nor to keep him in custody if he has been arrested, nor to keep
him in the receiving state, these are generally considered to be implicit
obligations.
The Agreement with The Federation of the West Indies contains, in
Article IX, (5) (a) and (5) (b), provisions comparable to those found in the
NATO Agreement, but adds the sentence: "In cases where the United States
authorities may have the responsibility for custody pending the completion
of judicial proceedings, the United States authorities shall, upon request,
make such a person immediately available to the authorities of the Territory
for purposes of investigation and trial and shall give full consideration to
any special views of such authorities as to the way in which custody should
be maintained."




in general retain or request custody, except where the offense is
"directed solely against the security of the Federal Republic,"
until release, acquittal or commencement of the sentence. The
sending state is expressly obligated to make the accused "availa-
ble to the German authorities for investigation and criminal
proceedings." 28 The Agreed Minutes supplementing the arrange-
ment with Japan provide that where Japan has primary jurisdic-
tion "The Japanese authorities will, unless they deem that there
is adequate cause and necessity to retain such offender, release
him to the custody of the United States military authorities pro-
vided that he shall, on request, be made available to the Japanese
authorities, if such be the condition of his release. The United
States authorities shall, on request, transfer his custody to the
Japanese authorities at the time he is indicted by the latter." 29
The Philippines Agreement similarly gives the United States
custody, but "pending trial and final judgment"; 30 that with
Libya provides that "The Libyan authorities will, if the United
States authorities request the release on remand of an arrested
member of the United States forces, release him from their
custody on the United States authorities' undertaking to present
him to the Libyan courts for investigatory proceedings and trial
when required." 31 There are, of course, no comparable provi-
sions, other than those simply calling for surrender of an arrested
member of the American forces, in those agreements, e.g., with
28 The Supplemental Agreement with the Netherlands imposes a com-
parable commitment; that with Greece simply states that "Custody of the
accused shall be maintained in Greece."
29 Re paragraph 5.
30 Article XIII, 5. The commanding officer is required to "acknowledge in
writing that such accused has been delivered to him * * * and that he will
be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when re-
quired by it."
31 Article XX (3). Procedural Agreement No. 16 to the 26 September 1953
Agreements with Spain provides that the United States will, upon request,
be given custody of a member of the United States Forces arrested by the
Spanish authorities (Article 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) ) and that the
United States shall retain custody of a member of the United States Forces
arrested by United States authorities. (Article 3j). If the Spanish authori-
ties are to exercise jurisdiction, custody "shall remain with the United
States authorities until such time as the trial is concluded and the sentence
pronounced. The United States authorities shall accept the responsibility of
assuring the presence of the offender at the appointed time of trial."
Article 8(c).
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Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, under which the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction.
The agreements cited display an increasing tendency to treat
custody as a separate issue from jurisdiction, and to permit the
sending state to have custody of an accused member of its forces
even when he has been arrested by the receiving state for an
offense as to which the receiving state has primary jurisdiction.
It is submitted that, since permitting the sending state to have
custody in no way prejudices any significant interest of the re-
ceiving state and can minimize international friction, it has
obvious merit.
WITNESSES
The right of courts-martial of sending states to sit in the re-
ceiving state is clear. 32 The courts-martial may, of course, compel
members of their forces to appear as witnesses and testify. The
NATO Agreement does not, however, contain any express provi-
sion for compulsory process to compel the attendance of nationals
of the receiving state as witnesses before a court-martial, al-
though a general provision requires reciprocal assistance "in the
collection and production of evidence." 33 The negotiators con-
templated that under this provision receiving states would be
obligated to compel the attendance of their nationals. 34 Only the
United States 35 and the United Kingdom 36 have, however, imple-
mented the obligation.
Where a member of a visiting force is tried in a court of the
receiving state he is, on the other hand, entitled "to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are
within the jurisdiction of the receiving state." 37 The receiving
state can in ordinary course summon members of the visiting
force as well as its own nationals, though it may need the as-
32 Article VII, 1(a) of the NATO Agreement provides that "[T]he mili-
tary authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within
the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on
them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military
law of that State." See p. 88, infra.
33 Article VII, 6(a).
a * Snee and Pye, op. cit. supra, note 22, at 95.
85 Service Courts of Friendly Foreign Forces Act, 22 USC 703.
3e Snee and Pye, op. cit. supra, note 22, at 97.
87 Article VII, 9(d).
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sistance of the commanding officer to effect service on a base.38
Paradoxically, then, a member of a force may be more effectively
protected in this regard when tried by a foreign court than when
tried by a court-martial.
The Agreement with West Germany reaffirms the obligation of
the sending state to compel a member of its force or civilian
component to appear before a German court. 39 More important,
it imposes on Germany the express obligation to secure the at-
tendance of witnesses before courts-martial "in accordance with
German law/' 40 The Agreement with Iceland adds comparable
commitments to the NATO provisions.41 The Libyan Agreement,
which follows the language of the NATO Agreement in many
provisions, adds to the paragraph modelled on Article VI (a)
relating to reciprocal assistance "in the collection and production
of evidence," the words "including the attendance of witnesses at
the trial." 42 The Agreement with Ethiopia imposes the reciprocal
obligations in more explicit language. 43 The Agreement with the
Dominican Republic, on the other hand, was less explicit even
than the NATO Agreement 44 and the revised Leased Bases
Agreement is, in this regard, vague. 45 Other agreements, e.g.,
38 Snee and Pye, op. cit. supra, note 22, at 94. Compelling a member of the
American forces to appear as a witness in a foreign court in which he may
not be protected against self-incrimination raises difficulties. Id., at 98 et seq.
39 Article 37, 1(a). The obligation with respect to dependents is qualified
by the phrase "insofar as the military authorities are able to secure their
attendance." Article 37, 1 (b)
.
40 Article 37, 2.
41 Article 2, 7(b).
42 Article XX (4).
43 Article XVII, 4.
44 Article XV. The reciprocal obligations are phrased in terms only of
"the collection of evidence"—but not its production—and "the seizure and in
proper cases the handing over of exhibits and all objects connected with
the offense."
45 Article VI, Leased Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941, denies to the
Territory the right to serve process—defined to include a summons, subpoena,
warrant, writ or other judicial document for securing the attendance of a
witness—on a base without the permission of the commander, but imposes
on the commander the obligation to serve the process. The Article then
provides that where the courts (only civil ?) have jurisdiction, the Terri-
tory "will on request give reciprocal facilities as regards the service of
process," which may or may not include service on a local national. See also
Article IV (4).
The Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies makes no reference
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those with Saudi Arabia, Denmark regarding Greenland, and
Korea, make no reference whatever to the problem.
Some, though not all recent agreements, have made more
explicit than does the NATO Agreement the obligations of the
sending and receiving states with respect to compelling the at-
tendance of witnesses before the other's tribunals. Requiring
such assistance, particularly by the receiving state when the send-
ing state is exercising jurisdiction, does raise an issue of policy.
So long, however, as the assistance is in the form of using the
receiving state's own process to compel attendance, the advantage
to the receiving state from the trial and punishment of offenders
would seem to outweigh the disadvantages. Only two agreements,
apparently, go farther, and deal specifically with the matters of
contempt and perjury. 46 Only the Agreement with West Germany
refers to the immunity of participants in a trial.47
CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
The NATO Agreement contains only two provisions which re-
late to the rights of a member of a visiting force against the send-
ing state. One is that a death sentence shall not be carried out
in the receiving state if its legislation does not provide for such
punishment in a similar case.48 The provision, for which there
are precedents,49 reflects a compromise prompted by the antipathy
of many NATO members toward capital punishment. The second,
a qualified double jeopardy provision, provides that one tried and
acquitted or punished by one state may "not be tried again for
the same offence within the same territory by the authorities of
another Contracting Party." 50 Normally, of course, this is more
restrictive vis-a-vis the receiving than the sending state. More-
over, an exception makes the restriction inapplicable to trials
by the military authorities of the sending state "for any violation
to the "defence areas" as such in this connection, but simply provides, in
Article IX (6) (a) that: "To the extent authorized by law, the authorities
of the Territory shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary
investigations into offences, in providing for the attendance of witnesses, and
in the collection and production of evidence * * *."
"Article XVII, 9 of the Ethiopian Agreement and Article XX (7) of the
Libyan Agreement.
47 Article 39.
* 8 Article VII, 7(a).
" Supra, p. 129.
60 Article VII, 8.
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of rules of discipline." There is no provision requiring trial in
the vicinity of the crime, for which there is also precedent.51
The provision, where it has appeared, was seemingly motivated
by a desire to protect the interests of the receiving state and its
nationals rather than those of the accused.
The Japanese, Icelandic, Australian, and Federation of the West
Indies Agreements also contain the restriction with respect to the
death penalty. No other agreement does. The Icelandic Agree-
ment varies the double jeopardy provision by making it ap-
plicable only to Iceland. The revised Leased Bases Agreement
makes the defense unavailable where a civil court of the Territory
and a United States court-martial have jurisdiction, but the court
conducting the second trial is directed to take into account any
punishment previously awarded. 52 Several agreements include
restrictions on the place of trial. The Agreed Minutes supple-
menting the Japanese arrangements require that in certain cases
the trial "shall be held promptly in Japan within a reasonable
distance from the places where the offenses are alleged to have
taken place unless other arrangements are mutually agreed
upon." 53 The Convention with West Germany provided that
where an offense was against "German interests" the trial had to
be held within the Federal territory except in cases of military
exigency. 54 The Agreement with West Germany has a comparable
provision. 55 The Agreement with Ethiopia is unique in that it
requires trial "within the installations or outside Ethiopia." 56
In general, then, subject to these limited restrictions in some
receiving states, the civil rights of an accused, tried by a court-
martial of the sending state, depend on that state's law only.
The civil rights of a member of a visiting force tried by a
court of the receiving state depend on the law of that state, in-
ternational law, and the terms of any applicable treaty. They
depend in no way on the law of the sending state, which governs
61 Supra, p. 130, n. 51 ; 134.
52 Article IV, (5) (b). In the unlikely event that the offence is within the
jurisdiction of a civil court of the Territory and a civil court of the United
States, trial by one excludes trial by the other. Article IV, (5)(c). The
Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies, in Article IX (8),
reverts to the NATO pattern.
53 Re paragraph 3 (c) , 2.
54 Article 8, 4.
55 Article 26.
56 Article XVII, 4.
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only the rights of an accused person with respect to acts of
that state.
Whether members of the American forces, tried in foreign
courts, would be accorded adequate protection has, quite properly,
caused much concern. The NATO Agreement enumerates a
significant list of rights to which the accused, whether a member
of a force or of the civilian component or a dependent, is en-
titled. 57 The Agreed Minutes supplementing the arrangements
with Japan add others, 58 as does the Agreement with Libya 59
and that with Spain. 60 Other agreements, including of course
57 Article VII, 9 reads:
Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is
prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled—
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges
made against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if
they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to
have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions pre-
vailing for the time being in the receiving state
;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent in-
terpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the send-
ing State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a
representative present at his trial.
The Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies repeats the NATO
list, in Article IX (9), but adds that the trial "shall be public except when
the court decrees otherwise in accordance with the law in force in the
Territory." Article 8(9) of the Australian Agreement is substantially the
same as Article VII, 9 of the NATO Agreement.
58 Re paragraph 9. The added rights specifically stated are
:
(a) He shall not be arrested or detained without being at once informed
of the charge against him or without the immediate privilege of
counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon
demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open
cours in his presence and the presence of his counsel;
(b) He shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an impartial tribunal;
(c) He shall not be compelled to testify against himself;
(d) He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses;
(e) No cruel punishment shall be imposed upon him.
59 Article 20 (5).
60 Procedural Agreement No. 16 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements
with Spain lists the rights accorded by the NATO Agreement and (1) Pro-
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those under which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction,
make no reference to civil rights.
The Senate, in its resolution giving its advice and consent to
the ratification of the NATO Agreement, stated it to be the sense
of the Senate that
:
"2. Where a person subject to the military jurisdiction of
the United States is to be tried by the authorities of a re-
ceiving state, under the treaty the Commanding Officer of the
Armed forces of the United States in such state shall ex-
amine the laws of such state with particular reference to the
procedural safeguards contained in the Constitution of the
United States
;
3. If, in the opinion of such commanding officer, under all
the circumstances of the case, there is danger that the ac-
cused will not be protected because of the absence or denial
of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States,
the commanding officer shall request the authorities of the
receiving state to waive jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 (c) of Article VII (which requires
the receiving state to give 'sympathetic consideration' to
such request) and if such authorities refuse to waive juris-
diction, the commanding officer shall request the Department
of State to press such request through diplomatic channels
and notification shall be given by the Executive Branch to the
Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives
;
4. A representative of the United States to be appointed
by the Chief of Diplomatic Mission with the advice of the
senior United States military representative in the receiving
state will attend the trial of any such person by the authori-
ties of a receiving state under the agreement, and any failure
to comply with the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article VII
of the agreement shall be reported to the commanding officer
of the armed forces of the United States in such state who
shall then request the Department of State to take appropri-
ate action to protect the rights of the accused, and notifica-
tection against an ex post facto law, (2) Protection against Bills of
Attainder, (3) Have a public trial and be present at his trial, (4) Have the
burden of proof upon the prosecution, (5) Be tried by an impartial Court
and (6) Be protected from the use of a confession obtained by illegal or
improper means.
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tion shall be given by the Executive Branch to the Armed
Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives."
The Department of Defense has fully performed the mandate
with which it was charged by the Senate, both within NATO
member states and elsewhere. It has, in this connection, had to
determine whether the standard of comparison should be the con-
stitutional rights the accused would enjoy in a Federal court, or
those he would enjoy in a state court, or those he would enjoy in
a court martial. The Department of Defense has adopted the
standard of the constitutional rights an accused would enjoy in a
state court, although literally read, the mandate of the Senate ap-
parently refers only to those he would enjoy before a court
martial. Reports have been regularly made to the Armed Services
Committees, and have consistently shown, with the rarest of
exceptions, no violations of the rights of the accused. The laws
of our allies have, in brief, adequately protected the rights of
members of our armed forces brought before their courts for trial.
